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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT 
The secretariat submits for the consideration of the 
Governments members of the Commission the following "Progress 
report on the technical studies undertaken by the ECLA 
secretariat in compliance with ẑ esolution 1(1) of the Trade 
Commixtee", together with 3 annexes (ïï/CN• 12/C.1/WG. l/l 5 2 
and 3) prepared for the Working Group on a Multilateral 
Payments Regime which is to meet from 27 April to 11 May 
1957j at Montevideo, Uruguay. This preli/ninary report on the 
work of the Trade Committee will be revised after the 
Montevideo session so that any comments formulated in the 
course of the Working Group's discussions may be incorporated 
into the text« 
It is also hoped that the Working Group will prepare a 
report on its activities, which will be presented in due course 





.. PROGRESS REPORT ON THE TECHNICAL STUDIES UNDERTAKEN BY THE ECLA 
SECRETARIAT IN COMPLIANCE WITH RESOLUTION 1(1) OF 
. THE TRADE COMMITTEE 
Pursuant to the recomniendation contained in resolution l(l) of the 
Trade Committee, adopted in November 1956, the Secretariat of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America has carried out certain technical studies 
relating to the possibilities of gradually establishing a regional payments 
regime on multilateral lines. The studies have been prepared with due 
regard to the suggestions embodied in the resolution, as well as to the 
relevant data and opinions supplied to the secretariat by the Central Banks 
of the intra-regional clearing accounts count ries^on the basis of a spocial 
questionnaire which was submitted to them in due course. 
I. .SIGNIFICANCE OF RESOLUTION 1 (l) OF THE TRADE COMMITTEE 
Before special reference is made to the secretariat studies, in the 
preparation of which the Central Banks gave invaluable assistance, the 
aims of the resolution in. question and the programme of action which it 
outlines must be briefly reviewed. 
1• Objectives 
One of the main objectives of the resolution is to prevent disturbance 
of the normal conduct and development of inter-Latin-American trade by the 
freezing of balances which is apt to result from bilateral practices. To 
this end, since there are still aspects of the balance-of-payments situation 
of the countries concerned which make it difficult to establish a free 
régime of payments in convertible currency, the existing system of bilateral 
•settlement of balances would be gradually replaced by a, system under which 
such settlements would be effected on a multilateral basis. Clearly, the 





introduction of a regime of this kind would provide an incentive to 
co-ordination of the exchange1 policy of the various countries, as one of 
the most important means of creating by degrees conditions favourable to 
the ultimate establishment of a common regional market, a subject which was 
also discussed by the Trade Coirimittee (resolution 3 (!)-)• 
As a programme of action for the progressive transition from the rigid 
bilateralism at present prevailing to a multilateral system, resolution 1(1) 
recommends the following measures: 
(a) The periodic exchange of data on the situation of the inter-Latin-
American clearing accounts among the Central Banks of the clearing-accounts 
countries. One of the aims of this part of the resolution is to promote the 
transfer of bilateral balances to accounts with third parties, automatically 
when such balances do and voluntarily when they do not exceed the level of 
the credit agreed upon between the Central Banks; 
(b) The revision of the existing accounts, at such time as the 
countries concerned may deem opportune, in conformity with several 
principles, among which may be mentioned equal quotations for units of 
account and convertible dollars in similar operations, commodity trade at 
world prices and the establishment of swing credits between Central Banks 
at a level high enough to permit the normal development of the operations 
concerned; and 
(c) The preparation of studies and suggestions conducive to the 
gradual establishment of the payments union through a Working Group composed 
of representatives of the Central Banks of the clearing-accounts, countries, 
or of the corresponding monetary authorities where no Central Bank exists. 
II. SECRETARIAT STUDIES 
The Secretariat has prepared the studies described below for present-
ation to the Working Group set up under the terms of resolution 1(1) with 
the collaboration of the Central Banks. 
/l « Compensation 
E/CN. 12/439 
Page 7 
1 • Compensation of balances in inter~Làtin-American trade 
(E/CN»  
The purpose of this study is to supply further data on existing 
conditions in their bearing upon the possible establishment of a multilateral 
payments régime, and thus to extend the research on this point embodied in 
other Secretariat -documents, i.e., Study of Inter-Latln-American Trade 
(E/CN.12/369/Rev.l) and Payments and Trade in Latin America (E/CN.12/C.1/3)^ 
The picture presented by these closely inter-related studies is sketched in 
broad outline below. 
Aracng the factors of a general nature "which favour the possible future 
establishment of a common payments régime, the two most important are the 
complementarity of many of the natural products on.which inter-Latin-American 
trade is traditionally based, and the obvious possibilities of strengthening 
this trade by.the incorporation of the semi-manufactured and manufactured 
goods which Latin America's incipient industry is producing, in the very 
lines for which regional demand expands as income grows. 
Alongside these auspicious circumstances of a general kind, there is 
one directly connected with the current structure of br.l̂ nces in bilateral 
accounts, which might be considered likely, up to a point to promote the, 
setting-up of a common payments, régime, provided that this latter were 
combined with specific co-operative practices in the trade policy of the 
member countries. The documents cited considered two aspects of the 
structure of balances. In E/CK.12/369, which dates from 1955, the possib-
ilities of multilateral compensation of. each country's net bilateral 
balances were analysed, ' , , 
Although this study covered as long a period as, twenty years and it.s 
findings were, on the whole, encouraging as regards the establishment of a 
multilateral system, it left some roan for doubt, as only trade balance • 
2/ Reproduced in Inter-Latin American trade; current problems (E/CN,12/423), 




statistics were available. More satisfactory background data were after-
wards obtained, in the shape of statistics on real receipts and expenditure 
through the clearing accounts over the period 1954-56. From the analysis 
made on this basis, with respect to the triennium mentioned, the picture 
obtained was very similar to that presented in document E/CN,12-/C.l/3. In 
fact, if the net positions registered during this three-year period are 
compared with the. amount of the swing credits stipulated in the payments 
agreements concerned, it will be seen that, broadly speaking, net balances 
in inter-Latin-American trade on account were lowrer than the corresponding 
bilateral credits. Consequently, if a multilateral clearing-house had 
existed, each country's margin of credit within the common mechanism would-
have absorbed virtually the whole of its disequilibria. Most of the debtor 
countries would have covered their liabilities without resorting to means of 
payment unrelated to the commodity trade liquidated within the reciprocal 
accounts. Of the eight countries involved in the inoer-Latin-American 
clearing-accounts regime, two only constitute exceptions to this general 
rule; but the amount of their final debit balances Is small in relation to 
the aggregate capacity for compensation. 
To turn to the factors indicated by the studies carried out as 
unfavourable to a multilateral system, emphasis must be laid on one of 
paramount importance, namely, the lack of co-ordination among the exchange 
policies of the clearing-accounts countries. However, certain bases for 
improved co-ordination are laid down in resolution l(l) of the Trade 
Committee* 
Yet another important point is stressed in the secretariat studies, 
especially E/CN, 12/369/ftev.l. This is the need for collaboration, among the 
various countries in the sphere of payments problems. As the document 
referred to points out, if success is to attend any programme for the 
establishment of a multilateral system, those taking part must necessarily 
be prepared to adopt certain measures without the application of which little 
can,be expected of the régime. First and foremost, they would have to do 




trade, which-would-involve the gradual elimination of the restrictive 
procedures at present hampering freedom of trade. The participating 
countries would also have to be prepared to. accept a higher degree of 
competition in inter-Latin-American trade, within a framework of reciprocal 
opportunities, although consideration might perhaps be given to the 
maintenance of certain special temporary measures for the. benefit of the 
economically-weaker members of the group. The study cited also calls 
attention to-the fact.that the satisfactory operation of a. multilateral 
payments system is bound up with the establishment of a reasonable degree 
of internal economic stability in the member countries. The prevention or 
control of inflationary processes is an' important factor in" thé maintenance 
of competitive export prices. In this connexion the countries taking part 
would have to be willing to adopt common measures aimed at safeguarding 'the 
balance of trade, and possibly to extend their mutual collaboration to a 
method of consultation on the determination or modification of exchange' 
ratés, to which recourse could be had whenever the balance, of inter-'Latin-
American trade was affected by this problem« 
2. Registration of operations transacted through Inter-Latin-
American clearing accounts and exchange of comparable data 
The aim of this document is to provide the Working Group on a Multi-
lateral Payments Regime with the background material for discussion of how 
the exchange of data envisaged in resolution 1(1) of the Trade Committee 
might.be initiated. 
As a first step towards the co-prdination. of the separate bilateral., 
mechanisms and their possible replacement by a multilateral system, this-
exchange of data would imply: 
(a) The periodic compilation, on comparable bases, of statistics as to 
the development and balances, of the inter-Latin-American clearing accounts,, 
and 
(b) The regular distribution of.such statistics, duly classified, 





On the basis of data and advice supplied by the Central Banks or 
equivalent organizations, the document first indicates possible lines along 
which uniform standards could be established for the registration of 
operations and the determination of balances. It also contains an outline 
of the method which would seem to be the "most suitable for the compilation 
and distribution of comparable data, confined in the initial stage to the 
totals and balances resulting from the registration of already-liquidated 
operations in the accounts. The data would also be extended to cover the 
real, statistical and potential balance in every inter-Latin-American 
clearing account. 
3• Bases for the draft standard agreement on a payments régime 
( E/CN o 12 /C. 1 ArG » 1/3 ) 
The object of this document is to submit for the consideration of the 
Working Group some background data on the possible preparation of a draft 
standard agreement for payments through a clearing mechanism, and it 
relates particularly to that part«of resolution 1 (I) in which the clearing-
accounts countries recorded their intention of adopting and applying 
concurrently, at the time they considered appropriate, the following basic 
principles: 
(a) Equal quotations for units of account and convertible currencies 
on the exchange markets concerned, for the same operations; 
(b) Trade at prices not higher than those prevailing on the world 
market. If no bases for comparison are available, quotations shall not 
exceed prices paid by any third country under the same conditions; 
(c) Payment through the agreement-accounts of the following items, 
inter alias the value òf the commodities traded, freight charges relating 
to direct traffic, insurance and reinsurance, other expenditures accessory 
to trade and other items agreed upon by the contracting parties; 
(d) Reciprocal credits adequate for the satisfactory development of 
trade, due allowance being made for seasonal fluctuations; 
(e) Automatic transfers to the accounts of other countries particip-




Central Bank- of the debtor country, of sums in excess of the stipulated 
swing creditsj and 
(f) Voluntary transfers from one to another of the above-mentioned 
countries' accounts, by prior agreement between the Central Banks concerned, 
of favourable balances within the swing credits. 
Document E/CN.12/C.l/WG.l/3, like the others cited, reflects the 
opinions expressed in this connexion by Central Banks and by monetary 
authorities of the same standing. Broadly speaking, it was felt that the 
preparation of a standard agreement for a caixpensatory payments régime 
within the region would fulfil a two-fold purpose. On the one hand, it 
wuld allow some idea to be formed of how far the general principles 
advocated in resolution 1(1) are applicable in the initial stage of inter-
Latin- American collaboration at the level in question, in view of the aifer-
rent characteristics of trade transactions in each bilateral channel.. 
Secondly, the agreement would provide some sort of guidance for the gradual 
establishment of more or less uniform regulations when the pacts in force 
were renewed or new ones were concluded. In addition, it would facilitate 
the task of concerting a common instrument for the ultimate establishment 
of the multilateral regime. 
Alongside these considerations, another of basic importance must be 
emphasized. The heterogenous nature of the various inter-Latin-American 
agreements in force exerts a depressive influence on trade, since it helps 
to freeze bilateral balances by making them, in practice, non-transferable, 
and thereby aggravates the effect of other problems such as the non-observance 
of parities, the fall in relative quotations for units of account, and the 
consequent discouragement and overpricing.of exports. Hence the importance 
for the growth of Latin American trade of the co-ordination or standardization 
of the main clauses in such agreements. 
The preliminary bases laid down with this object in view in document 
E/CN.12/C.1/WG.1/3 cover the following points: purpose of the accounts,. 
operations included, units of account, liquidation of payments and 




transfers, other regulations as to balances, prior deposits, official base 
values, temporary exports and imports and provisos of a general nature, 
4« " Study of the multilateral system 
Apart from the documents listed above, the Secretariat, is "also engaged 
on the preparation of the technical study on the multilateral,system 
contemplated in resolution 1(1). This study, -which is not yet completed, 
will attempt to examine the positive and negative aspects of the devices by 
means of which such a régime might be established, and the gradual stages 
by which it might suitably be introduced» , • 
In accordance with a fundamental guiding principle laid down by the 
Governments represented on the Trade Committee, the study takes into account 
the need for the establishment of the multilateral system to be envisaged -
as a phase in the progressive advance towards the total liberalization of 
trade, whether intra-regional or with the rest of the world. Payments 
regulations should therefore be associated with others designed to ensure 
the gradual disappearance of the restrictions hampering trade; and all .these 
should be adopted concurrently with yet others intended to encourage 
collaboration among the countries taking part in the system, so that 
bilateral disequilibria might be eliminated or reduced through the.expansion 
of commodity trade. 
On these general bases, the following are the main topics on which, by 
means of technical analysis, the study in course of implementation will 
seek to shed some light; 
(a) Thé nature of the system for multilateral settlement of balances 
deriving from bilateral trade movements will be discussed together with the 
question as to whether such settlements should or should not be effected 
automatically and at regular intervals. 
(b) An attempt will be made to determine whether it would be better to 
maintain current practices with respect to bilateral credits or to.replace 
them by a centralizing regime. In the latter case, such credits would lose 
their present character and would be extended by each country to the group 




contribution to the aggregate amount of credits. This would mean that each 
individual quota would have to be fixed when the country concerned acceded 
3/ 
to the system, either at the time of its constitution or in the future. 
Among the factors considered in this part of the study are the following: 
the amount of the total movements - receipts and expenditure - registered 
in each country1s inter-Latin-American accounts; the importance of the 
seasonal disequilibria-usually arising in the bilateral mechanisms in the 
course of each fiscal year; and the magnitude and nature of the annual 
bilateral disequilibria recorded in the past, both in general and in relation 
to the commodities representing the bulk of the trade under consideration. 
The acceptance of this system as satisfactory would mean that the 
payments union would take over the bilateral credits and debits of the 
participating countries. Each member would become a creditor or debtor of 
the new organization, to the amount of the net surplus or deficit registered 
with respect to the other members at the exniry of the predetermined 
compensation period (for example, one month). 
(c) As a corollary of the preceding point, the position of the bilateral 
accounts under the multilateral régime and the desirability of their 
maintenance would be examined. Should they continue in force, their books, 
besides registering, as at present, the movements corresponding to direct 
trade transactions between the contracting parties, would include multi-
lateral transfers under the new organization. On one assumption, apart 
from the monthly credits accorded to each other by the countries concerned 
to permit the operation of the multilateral system, bilateral credits would 
no longer be granted within the accounts, since they would be replaced by-
each member1^ quota within the centralized multilateral credit. 
(d) The study will .also consider whether the multilateral payments 
system would or would not require circulating capital in convertible 
2/ On the creation of the European Payments Union, basic quotas were fixed 
at the equivalent of 15 per cent of the value registered for the aggregate 
trade of the country concerned with the other members of the organization. 





currencies, and the amount of such capital that would be needed. 
In any event, it is foreseeable from the outset that if such capital 
existed it would hardly cover payments deriving from structural disequili-
bria. These might better be remedied, as has already been suggested, by 
co-operation among the various countries in matters of trade policy, with 
a view to alleviating debit balances through the expansion of- trade in 
goods, and services. The main purpose of the capital would be to prevent 
the delays which might be occasioned in the effecting of transfers, when 
these exceeded the individual country's quota, by the probable lack of 
synchronization between claims and payments under the system. 
(e) Another topic dealt with in the report will be that of the 
regulations for settling net balances over and above each country's quota 
in convertible foreign exchange. To this end, the current situation, on 
which adequate data is available in document B/CN.12/C.1/3, will first be 
taken into account. As is pointed out in that study, under the bilateral 
accounts system a tendencjr to impart the greatest possible flexibility to 
the swing credits mechanism is evident both in the fixing of maximum levels 
and in the habit of abstention from demanding payment of balances in 
convertible currencies. Just as. in some channels trade is carried on with 
a practically unlimited margin of credit, so there are few countries which 
make use of their contractual right to request that their credit balance be 
covered in dollars once the crucial point has been reached. Several 
countries have taken up this attitude in relation to large assets that have 
accumulated in bilateral accounts until the stipulated credit has been 
exceeded. The well-known depressive effects which the exercise of the 
right in question would produce on trade are among the considerations on 
which such conduct is based. Another, allied to this, springs from the 
fact that certain disequilibria which are very marked if assessed within 
the short term of one year tend to right themselves spontaneously over the 
medium tern. In this way the policy governing the granting of official 
credits and the collection of surpluses in convertible currency reveals 




also partly brought about by another important factor, namely, the chronic 
shortage of convertible currencies affecting alinost all the South American 
countries. Because of this, it is felt to be preferable that resources 
required for the development of foreign trade "with other regions should not 
be deflected to inter-Latin-American payments. Thus the South American 
republics included in the transferable sterling zone very seldom resort to 
that currency to settle their reciprocal balances; neither is the convertible 
dollar used for this purpose. Fundamentally, the reasons are the same as 
those which induce many of the South American countries to conduct their 
reciprocal trade on the basis of units of account. 
But it is an established fact that the frequent freezing of balances 
entailed by this state of affairs sets up a formidable barrier to the 
continuity and expansion of trade. Consequently, the multilateral system 
aimed at should not only generate the steady absorption of balances, but 
ought also, in the early years, while progress is being made towards a 
higher degree of multilateralism, to prevent" the resultant benefit from 
turning into a disadvantage by causing a convertible-currency drain on the 
balance of payments. The study will therefore discuss in addition whether, 
in order to liquidate surpluses within the multilateral mechanism's working 
capital, measures such as the following should or should not be contemplated: 
i) The assignment of a predetermined period during which the creditor 
or debtor country, as the case might be, could modify its position in 
relation to the system simply by further transfers' or additional commodity 
A , 4 / ^ . trade and 
ii) Provision for the surplus still registered after expiry of the 
period of defennent to be covered or collected, according to whether the 
country concerned is a debtor or a creditor^ in convertible foreign exchange 
and on one or several occasions. 
¿/ The period of defennent might prove, unnecessary if the credit quota for 
each country in the union were fixed at fairly high levels, so as to 




Consideration will also be given to the desirability in certain cases 
- because of the balance-of-payment s situation of the creditor or debtor 
country, or for other reasons - of liquidation of the surplus by a single 
payment or in specific instalments. 
To return to the possible period of deferment, it should be noted that 
particular attention will be devoted to this subject, as under given circum-
stances such a regime might complicate the operation of the system. In any 
event, if a period of deferment is granted in favour of the debtor, this 
would seem to Imply that the organization's payments to the creditor could 
also be similarly deferred. Otherwise it would be difficult to safeguard 
the purposes for which the multilateral organization's working capital is 
designed. 
(f) From another angle, in order to carry out a study parallel to that, 
on the multilateral régime, the secretariat is collecting the data required • 
for an analysis pf the trade measures that might help to stabilize balances 
within a framework of expanding trade, especially in connexion with 
obstacles that could be removed by means of suitable agreements. 
(g) The study will also deal with the questions of procedure that 
would.be inherent in the mechanism of the multilateral system if the latter1 s 
institution were decided upon. Apart from examining the way in which the 
functions of an agent for purposes of computing and actually effecting 
transfers could be fulfilled, it will discuss the advisability of such 
regulations as the following: 
i) On the last day of each month, the Central Banks responsible for 
keeping the master accounts would cable the balance of their inter-Latin-
American bilateral accounts to the agent acting for the organization; 
ii) The agent would assess the position between each pair of 
countries on the basis of the data'received. If in a given case counterpart 
accounts were kept, the balance resulting from a comparison of the two 
accounts would be recorded on the books; . 
iii) After calculating the transfers that would be feasible on the 
basis of the variation in each country's net bilateral balances during the 




made from one bilateral account to another. (To this end, the text of the 
standar4 agreement ought perhaps to put on record the willingness of the 
Central Banks for'each,and all of them, "on the basis of the agent's inform-
ation, to register in their bilateral accounts movements deriving from 
multilateral transfers.) ^ 
This would be the'method of liquidating all the bilateral credit and 
debit balances of those taking part in the system, who would then become 
creditors or debtors of the organization itself.^ 
(h) To complète this progress report on the technical study in course 
of preparation, it should be added that another point to be investigated is 
. t , 
the advantage or disadvantage of including under the multilateral system 
the whole of the reciprocal trade of the countries with inter-Latin-American 
clearing accounts. Between some of these countries trade relations are 
based not on the clearing system, but on the use of convertible currency, 
although for amounts representing a low percentage of the value of trade on 
clearing accounts. 
(i) For the pursuance of the technical study the secretariat will be 
particularly pleased to receive, the suggestions of the Working Group, which 
The follovang example .will serve -as an illustration. If in a specific 
bilateral account a credit balance of 100 were registered in favour of 
country A against country B, the union would transfer this sum to the 
assets of the former, issuing instructions to the Central Banks concerned 
to do the same. The bilateral surplus or deficit would thus disappear. 
6/ To return, for the sake of a clearer explanation, to the example previous-
ly cited, if in a given month the total bilateral credit balances of 
country A attained the value of 500 and its bilateral debts that of 200, 
this country would be the union's creditor for an amount of only 300. As 
previously stated, its bilateral credit and debit balances would have 
been automatically wiped out. In the successive operations of this type 
carried out by the union from month to month it might happen that a 
member's positive or negative balance increased or was reversed. In this 
connexion it should be recalled that if a debtor acquired a credit 
balance within the union, the member's debit balance would be automatic-




will open its session at Montevideo on 29 April, These suggestions, 
together with the present report, wiU be transmitted to the Seventh Session 
of the Economic Commission of Latin America (La Paz, 15-29 May 1957)* 
III, CO-OPERATION OF INTERNATIONAL SPECIALIZED AGENCIES 
Resolution l(l) of the Trade Committee stipulates that the Working 
Group on a multilateral payments regime shall have at Its disposal the 
EC LA Secretariate technical studies, the progress of which has been 
described above, and, further, that "through the secretariat (it) shall 
request the technical assistance of the Internationa^ Monetary Fund. It 
shall likewise be empowered11, the resolution adds, "to ask for the 
assistance of the Organization for European Econanic Co-operation, in view 
of its experience in the operation of the European Payments Union, and the 
collaboration of other international organizations, of the monetary author-
ities, of other States Members of EC LA and of experts employed at its 
request by the ECLA Secretariat". 
In view of the stage reached in the secretariat's studies on the 
multilateral payments system, the time is felt to be at hand when the co-
operation of the international specialized agencies, especially the 
International Monetary Fund, would be extremely useful. At the first 
meeting of the Working Group, therefore, the secretariat will request it to 
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COMPENSATION OF BALANCES IN INTER-LIT IN-AMERICAN TRADE 
1. Margin of transferability according to real receipts and 
expenditure registered in clearing af counts in 1955 and 1956 
An analysis has already been made in an earlier document ̂  of the 
ways in which an intra-regional organization for multilateral transfers 
could have operated during the last twenty years. The values taken into 
account for this purpose were those of commodity trade both among the ten 
South American countries and among the eight that conduct their trade 
through clearing accounts, i.e., Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador^. Paraguay and Uruguay. As real payments through- these 
accounts could not be ascertained, the analysis was based on the figures ... 
for visible foreign trade deriving from the f.o.b. values registered in 
the official exports statistics. Despite this limitation, the conclusions-
reached in the.document are encouraging as regards the possibilities of 
establishing an intra-regional payments régime which would impart some 
degree of transferability to the units of account and thus reduce the 
obstacles to the expansion af trade created by the freezing of balances. 
In fact, according to the data available, a transfer organization would 
have been able to compensate balances, without resorting to funds from 
other sources, up to a relatively high annual level, which in 1955 would 
have covered about 93 per cent of each country's ne.t balances. The 7 
per cent (or 62 million dollars) not susceptible of compensation was 
equivalent in that year to approximately one-third of the total bilateral 
swing credits (amounting to about 170 million dollars) granted within the 
intra-regional clearing accounts. 
In «the early months of 1957 it was possible, with the direct 
collaboration of the Central Banks, to compile the data on real payments 
settled through the accounts concerned in the course of the past two years. • 
Thus more satisfactory background data were collected on which to base an 
appraisal of the degree of transferability which would have been attained by 
the relevant balances in 1955 and 1956 had a multilateral compensatory^ , 




mechanism existed. Although this is too short a period for final 
conclusions proper to be reached, it is worth noting that in the two 
years mentioned the capacity for compensation as deduced from the 
receipts and expenditure actually registered in each account was, 
broadly speaking; very similar to that resulting from the previous 
2/ examination of the trade balances.—' 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: POSSIBILITIES FOR COMPENSATION OF -BALANCES 
REGISTSRSD IN INTER-LATIN-AMERICAN CLEARING ACCOUNTS 
(Percentages, on the basis of real receipts and expenditure) 
1955 1956 
Bilaterally compensated 84*7 83.7 
Multilaterally compensatable 6.6 4-5 
Non-compensatable net balances 8.7 11-8 
Total payments 100-0 100.0 . 
Total payments (Millions of dollars) 968.0 730.0 
Source: Statistics supplied by the Central Banks and other monetary 
authorities." 
a/ On the basis of the real receipts and expenditure of the following 
countries: Argentina;,- Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay .and Uruguay. 
In factj a multilateral transfer mechanism would have compensated.. 
91*3 per cent of the payments registered In the accounts in 1955* The 
remaining sum of 84 million dollars would have had to be. financed by 
recourse to the swing credits stipulated in the agreement or by the 
utilization of foreign exchange from other payments areas. In 1956 the 
position with respect to the compensatable margin was much the same as in 
1955, although it reflected the preceding year1s recesion.in intra-regional 
trade, brought about by such well-known causes as the difficulties in the 




bilateral accounts system created by the exchange reforms introduced in 
several of the South-American countries, and the importing of United 
States agricultural surpluses^ The amounts collected or paid out through 
the accounts, which in 1955 had totalled 968 million dollars, dropped to 
730 million in 1956- The margin of transferability, in turn, fell to 
88.2'per cent'of total payments. Thus, the sum that could not be compensated 
amounted to 37 million dollars in 1956; it should be pointed out that the 
swing credits had risen to 158 million dollars by the end of that year 
(see table l). 
2. Sums compensatable according to net bilateral 
balances in the triennium 1954-56 
Another.useful.means of investigating the prospects for the possible 
operation of a multilateral transfer mechanism is by examining the net 
balances registered.in the clearing accounts, data on which are now 
available for the triennium 1954-56. If the relevant figures are considered 
in the aggregate, it can be seen that during this period the net bilateral 
disequilibria in the inter-Latin-American accounts of the group of eight 
counti-ies previously mentioned.totalled 399 million dollars. The existence 
of a multilateral clearing-house would have enabled 38 per cent of such., 
disequilibria, or a sum of 153 million dollars,, to be covered (see table 2). 
• Table 2 
IKTER-LATIN-AI4ERieAN-TRi\DE> THROUGH CLEARING ACCOUNTS: :•• 
FINANCING OF TQTAL(BILATERAL BALANCES . 
-(Millions of dollars) 
• 1954 1955 : 1956 
Total 
1954-1956 
1. Total bilateral credit 
and debit balances 132 14S 119 399 
2. Multilateral compensations 56 64 33 153 
3. Compensations through time - 100 14 114 
Non-compensatable balances (l-2f3) 76 zl6 72 122 
Source : Statistics supplied by the Central Banks or other monetary authorities 
of the following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay. 




Another point deserves mention. Mot only could part of the net 
balances have been automatically settled through multilateral transfers, 
but a certain proportion of these same balances would have been absorbed 
through the phenomenon which in the terminology of the European Payments 
Union is defined as "compensation through time", that is, a reversal of 
the position of certain countries which, after being debtors in one year, 
become creditors in the next, or vice versa. By virtue of reversals of 
this kind, so frequent in inter-Latin-American clearing mechanisms, an 
i 
additional 114 million dollars would have been compensated. In short, 
if the existing accounts had been handled under a multilateral régime, by 
the end of the three-year period 1954-56 the net balance would have 
dropped from 399 to 132 million dollars, thus reducing by about two-thirds 
the sum which would have been financed by recourse to credit or disbursements 
of other foreign exchange. 
There are also grounds for the belief that the introduction of a . J:--
multilateral payments mechanism will induce the member countries to 
co-operate more closely in matters of trade policy, with a viextf to 
watching the progress of disequilibria and promoting additional commodity 
trade in order to check their growth. The proportion of non-compensatable• 
balances shown in table 2 would probably.not have been so high if the 
transfer mechanism had really existed. 
On the basis of the statistics for the net balances registered in 
the clearing accounts during 1954-56, table 3;shows how far each country 
contributed to the formation of these balances. It also indicates v/hat 
would have been the position of the countries under consideration if the 
non-compensatable balance under the multilateral régime had stood at the 





INTBR-IATIN-AMERICAN "TRADE THROUGH CLEARING ACCOUNTS; 
NET CREDIT OR DEBIT- BALANCES OF"INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES 
(Millions: of dollars) 
Cumulative 
balance 
1954 1955 1956 1954-56 
Argentina' t 7.5 t 8.5 t 23.1 t 39.1 
Bolivia f 1.1 - 2-5 - 8.3 - 9.7 
Brazil t 15.2 - 23.3 - 30.4 - 38.5 
Colombia - 6.5 - 6.2 - 4-6 - 17.3 
Chile' - '27-3 t 25.5 t 7.6 t 5r.8 
Ecuador f 7-6 t 6.4 t 4.3 1.18.3 
Paraguay - - 4.3 t 1.7' t 2.3 t 0.3 
Uruguay t 6.7 - 10.1 t 6.0 t 2.6 
Total t 38.1 t 42.1 t 43.3 t'65.8 
Source: Statistics supplied by Central Banks and other monetary authorities. 
The creditor countries in the group were. Argentina, Chile-, Ecuador and 
Uruguay .> the aggregate balance in whose favour amounted to approximately 
66 million dollars over the whole period. ._BqliyLaj» Brazil, Colombia and 
Uruguay were the debtors. This does not mean that -all- debtor countries 
must necessarily cover their net deficit with foreign exchange other than 
the units of account, as can be seen, from table' •4,' which shows the amount, 
of the bilateral credits existent within the accounts, and table 5> which • 
compares the disequilibria î hich arose during the three-year period with 




Page 26 Table 4 
MOUNT OF SWING CREDITS GRANTED IN INTER-LATIN-AMERICAN 
CLEARING ACCOUNTS 






bia . Chile Ecuador Paraguay Uruguay Total 
Argentina X 3.0 40.0 ^ b/ 15-0 2.0 3.0 5.0 68.0 
Bolivia 3.0 j X - b/ 0.5 b/ y b/ 3.5 
Brazil 40.0 â/ - X b/ 3.225 y y 3.0 46.225 
Colombia . b/ b/ -b/ X b/ y y y -
Chile 15.0 0.5 3.225 b/ X 0.25 y y 18.975 
Ecuador 2.0 b/ y £/ 0.25 X y y 2.25 
Paraguay- 3.0 b/ b/ b/ y y • t • 4.0 7.0 
Uruguay 5.0 V 3.0 b/ b/ y " 4.0 X ; 12.0 
Total 68.0 3.5 46.225 — 18.975 2.25 7.0 12.0 157-95 
Source : Official text of the' trade and payments agreements concerned. 
a/ This credit is unlimited. The sum noted represents the peak figure 
reached in October 1954* 
b/ There is no clearing account in operation. 
c/ No credit fixed; settlements are made every six months in convertible dollars. 
Table 5 
INTER-LATIN-AMERICAN TRADE THROUGH CLEARING ACCOUNTS:' 
COMPARISON OF DESE¡¿UILIBRIA AND SWING CREDITS IN 1954-56 ' . 











































Table 5 shows that in the last three years as a whole most of the 
bilateral trade of which the values were liquidated within the accounts 
registered net balances bfclovr the level of the credits stipulated in the 
agreements. Hence, if the term fixed for settling debit balances had 
been one of three years, very few countries - in fact, only two - would 
have been obliged to cover their net deficits with foreign exchange from 
other sources; and in practice this actually happened. One of these two 
countries, Bolivia, reached' an agreement with Argentina, its most important 
creditor, under the terms of which the debt concerned, amounting to 8 
million dollars on 31 December 1956, was consolidated, and arrangements 
were made for it to be paid off in petroleum. As regards the other debtor 
country, Colombia, the situation is accounted for by the special character-
istics of its agreement with Ecuador. As swing credits are not stipulated, 
the net balances are automatically settled at the close of each half-year. 
To turn now to the over-all picture presented by the statistics for 
the three-year period, it is clear that during this time a multilateral 
agency responsible for the transfer of balances among the existing inter-
Latin-American clearing accounts would have been able to operate in 
relatively satisfactory conditions on the basis of a three-year term for 
settlement of the net balances. It is needless to add that the annual 
development of bilateral transactions in each of the last three years 
would have to be examined more thoroughly. Prom a detailed analysis of this 
kind it could be discovered whether the seasonal disequilibria, so frequent 
in Latin America, would or would not have involved prolonged delays in the 
effecting of transfers to or from the countries they affected, and whether , 
the freezing of balances that often hampers the normal course of the region's 
trade would have been avoided to a sufficient extent.^ This analysis can'be 
made most opportunely when the time comes to study the bases for a credit 
pool common to all the clearing accounts, if the constitution of such a pool 
should be deemed a satisfactory means of providing the future transfer 
instrument with its working capital; this capital could, of course, always 
be supplemented with the additional resources required for the proper 
functioning of the new organization, and perhaps for covering some proportion 
of the disequilibria with convertible currencies. 





INTER-LATIN-AMERICAN CLEARING ACCOUNTS: REAL BALANCES 
(Thousands of dollars) 
Argen- Boli-
t,ina via Brazil Chile 
Para-
Ecuador guay Uruguay 
To 31/12/55 
Argentlna<! To 31A2/56 
[To .31/ 1/57 
fTo 31/12/55 
Bolivia <Ho 31/12/56 
To 31/ 1/57 
[To 31/12/55 
Brazil <!TO 31/12/56 
[to 31/ 1/57 
[To 31/12/55 
Chile <To 31A2/56 
Lto 31/ 1/57 
To 31A2/55 
Ecuador <!TO 31/12/56 
[To 31/ 1/57 
To 31/12/55 
Paraguay <To 31/12/56 
[To 31/ 1/57 
(To 31/12/55 
Uruguay <To 31/12/56 
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Source: Central Banks and monetary authorities. 
a/ The balance existing on 31 December 1956 was transferred to the "consolidated 
debt" account, which on 31 January 1957.showed a balance of 8,247,553 dollars. 
This account is to be liquidated, within a period of five years as from 
January 1958, with deliveries of Bolivian petroleum. 
b/ There are no clearing accounts in operation. 






INTER-LATIN AMERICAN TRADE THROUGH CLEARING ACCOUNTS? RECEIPTS..-
' AND EXPENDITURE.REGISTERED IN THE-ACCOUNTS IN 1955 • 

























Argentina X 4.4 137.8 a/ 34.0 0.1 18.1 2.1 196.5 
Bolivia 1.6 X 1.2 a/ - a/ a/ . a/ 2.8 
Brazil 110.0 0.9 X a/ 9-2 a/ • V 35.3 155.4 
Colombia s/ a/ a/ X a/ 1.0 a/ a/ 1.0 
Chile 55-2 - 13.4 a/ X 1.3 a/ a/ 69.9 
Ecuador 0.4 a/ a/ 7.2 1.2 X y ^ a/ 8.8 
Paraguay 19-3 a/ a/ a/ a/ V ...x 1.4 28.7 
Uruguay 1.5 a/ . 26.3 a/ y . V 0.9 28-7. 
Total ' 188.0 178.7 7.2 khJt 2.4 19-0 38.8 483.8 
Source: Central Banks and monetary authorities, 





INTER-LATIN-AMERICAN TRADE THROUGH CLEARING ACCOUNTS': ' RECEIPTS 
AND EXPENDITURE REGISTERED IN THE ACCOUNTS IN 1956 ' * 
(Millions of dollars) 
Importer 
conn 





















Argentina X 9.8" 91.5 a/ 25.0 " 0.05 10.6 4.6 " 141.6 
Bolivia 3.9 X 1.7 a/ 0.3 y y y 5.9 
Brazil 69.3 3.8 X a/ 13.1 y y '25.2 111.4 
Colombia a/ £ / y x . y 0.4 y : y 0.4 
Chile 32.2 0.6 13.0 a/ X r.2 y y 47.0 
Ecuador 0.02 a/ a/ 5.0 ' 1.0 X y y 6.0 
Paraguay 12.7 a/ a/ a/ y y X 2.1 14-. 8 
Uruguay 0.4 a/ 35.6 y y y 1.9 X 37.9 
Total 118.5 14.2 m . a M 39-4 '1.7 12.5 31.9 365.0 
Source: Central Banks and monetary authorities. 





INTER-LATIN-AMERICAN TRADE1 THROUGH CLEARING ACCOUNTS: 
: BILATERAL SURPLUSES AND. DEFICITS IN 1954 
(Millions of dollars) 
. . . . . Argen- Boli- Colom- Ecua- Para- Uru-
tina via Brazil 5 bia Chile dor guay guay 
Argentina X tO-7 tl9.® 
/ a/ -25.3 f0.9 -3.3 -0.3 
Bolivia -0.7 X - 0 . 4 ^ V - a/ a/ a/ 
Brazil -19.8 x a/ -1,8 a/ . a/ t6.(£ 
Colombia a/ a/ a/ X a/ t6.5 a/ a/ 
Chile +25-3 a/ tl.8 a/ , X f0.2 a/ a/ 
Ecuador -0.9 a/ a/ -6.5 -0.2 X a/ a/ 
Paraguay t3.3 â/ a/ S/' a/ s/ X ti.o^ 
Uruguay t0.3 v ' -6.0^ a/ a/ a/ -1.0^/ X 
Positive 
balances f 23.9 1.1 21.6 - 27.3 7.6 . - 7.0 
Negative 
balances - 21.4 - 6.4 6-5 , — 4.3 0.3 
Net balances t7.5 tl.l tl5.2 -6.,5 -27.3 . t7.6 -4.3 ;t6v7 ; 
Source ; Central Banks and monetary authorities, . ' 
Note: The signs (f) and (-) correspond to the countriès at the top of the 
columns• 






INTER-LATIN-AMERICAN TRADE THROUGH CLEARING ACCOUNTS: 
BILATERAL SURPLUSES AND DEFICITS IN 1955 

















Argentina X -2.8 -27.8 a/ +21.2 f0.3 fl.2 -0.6' 
Bolivia f2.8 X -0.3 a/ . - a/ a/ a/ 
Brazil t?-7.8 +0.3 X s/ f4.2 a/ a/ -9.0 
Colombia a/ â/ a/ X â/ +6.2! a/ a/ 
Chile -21.2 .a/ -4.2 a/ X -0.06 a/ a/ 
Ecuador -0.3 A/ a/ -6.2 t0.06 X a/ a/ 
Paraguay -1.2 a/ a/ a/ a/ Â/' X -0.5 ' 
Uruguay +0.6 A/ f9.0 a/ Â/ a/' 0.5 X 
Positive 
balances f 31.2 0.3 9.0 _ 25-5 6.5 1.7 m» 
Negative 
balances - 22.7 2.8 32.3 6.2 0.06 " 10.1 
Net. balances +8.5 -2.5 -23-3 -6.? +25-.5 +6.4 +1.7 -10.1 
Source : Central Banks and monetary authorities. ;: 
Note; The signs (f) and (-) correspond to the countries at, the top of the. 
columns. 





INTER-LATIN-AMERICAN TRADE THROUGH CLEARING ACCOUNTS: 
BILATERAL SURPLUSES AND DEFICITS IN 1956 
(Millions of dollars) 
Argen- Boli- Bra- Colom- Chi- Ecua- Para- Uru-
tina via zil bia le dor guay guay 
Argentina X -5.9 -22.2 a/ t7.2 -0.03 f2.1 -4.2 
Bolivia t'5.9 X f2.1 a/ f0.3 §/ a/ a/ 
Brazil t22.2 -2.1 X a/ -0.1 a/ a/ tl0.4 
Colombia V a/ a/ X a/ t4-6 a/ ä/ 
Chile -7.2 -0.3. to.i A/ X -0.2 a/ a/ 
Ecuador f0.03 a/ " Ä/ -4.6 f0.2 X a/ a/ 
Paraguay- -2.1 a/ a/ a/ a/ a/ X -0.2 
Uruguay t4.2 a/ -10.4 a/ a/ &/ f0.2 X 
Positive 
balances.F 32.4 — 2.2 _ 7.7 4.6 2.3 10.4 
Negative 
balances - 9.3 8.3 32.6 4.6 0.1 0.23 4.4 
Net balances f23.1 -8.3 -30.4 -4.6 t7.6 t4.3 f2.3 f6.0 
Source: Central Banks and monetary authorities. 
Note: The signs (t) and (-) correspond to the countries" at the top of the 
columns. 





IWTER-LATIN-AMERICAN CLEARING ACCOUNTSt COMPARISON OF DISEQUILIBRIA 
AND SWING CREDITS ON THE' HYPOTHESIS OF . A MULTILATERAL 
SYSTEM DURING THE TRIEMTIUM 1954-56 
(Millioris of dollars) 
Margins of credit Surplus or 
at the beginning deficit in 
of each year the year 
Credit Bobit concerned 
Margins-of credit 
Disequilibrium at the end of each 
not covered by year . 
- credits Credit Debit 
1 9 5 4 
Argentina 68.0 68.0 + 7-5 — 60.5 75.5 
Bolivia 3.5 3.5 t 1.1 - 2.4 4.6 
Brazil 46.2 46.2 t 15.2 - '31.0 61.4 
Colombia «V - - 6.5 - 6.5 - -
Chile 19.0 19.0 - 27-3 - 8.3 38.0 -
Ecuador 2.3 2.3 t 7.6 t ' 5.3 - 4.6 
Paraguay 7.0 7.0 - 4-3 11.3 2.7 
Uruguay 12.0 12.0 t 6.7 - 5.3 18.7 
Total 158.0 158.0 t 38.1 t 5.3 14.8 148.5 167.5 
1 9 5-5 
Argentina 60.5 75-5 t 8.5 « 52.0 84-0 
Bolivia 2.4 4.6 - 2.5 - 4.9 2.1 
Brazil 31.0 61.4 - 23-3 - 54.3 38.1 
Colombia — — - 6.2 — 6 - 2 * / — -Chile 38.0 — t 25.5 f 8.3 V 20,8 17.2 
Ecuador - 4.6 t 6.4 t 6.4 _ 4.6 
Paraguay 11.3 2.7 t 1-7 9.6 4.4 Uruguay 5.3 18.7 - 10.1 - 15.4 8.6 
Total ' 148.5 167.5 t 42.1 t 14.7 - 6.2 157.0 159.0 
1 9 5 6 
Argentina 52.0 84.0 t 23.1 , - 28.9 •'"' 107.1 
Bolivia 4.9 2.1 - 8.3 — 6.2 7.0 — 
Brazil 54.3 38.1 - 30.4 — 84-7 7.7, 
Colombia — - - 4.6 - 4.6 _ MB 
Chile 20.8 17.2 t 7.6 - 13.2 24.8 
Ecuador - 4-6 t 4.3 t 4.3 — 4.6 Paraguay 9.6 4.4 t 2.3 - 7.3 6.7 
Uruguay 15.4 8.6 t 6.0 - 9.4 14.6 
Total 157.0 . 159.0 t 43.3 t 4.3 10.8 150.5 165-5 
Source; Central Banks and monetary authorities. 
a/ This figure was established on the basis of the hypothesis that the country 
concerned, should its debit position vis-a-vis the other members be reversed, 
will in the first place have the right to recover such convertible foreign 
exchange as it may have disbursed when its deficit exceeded the level of 
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REGISTRATION OF OPERATIONS TRANSACTED THROUGH- INTER-LATIN-AMERICAN 
CLEARING ACCOUNTS AND EXCHANGE OF COMPARABLE DATA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the first session of the Trade Committee of the Economic Commission 
for Latin America (Santiago, November 1956), the countries in this region 
which liquidate the values of their reciprocal trade through clearing 
accounts resolved, with a view to the progressive attainment of a 
multilateral payments régime, to promote the application of the measures 
set forth in resolution l(l) of the Committee, These include the 
periodical and opportune exchange between Central Banks or corresponding 
monetary authorities of data on the situation of the inter-Latin-American 
clearing accounts, with the aim of ¿facilitating the transfer of balances 
as envisaged in the same resolution. 
It is worth recalling that the exchange of such information, on bases 
similar to those indicated in resolution 1(1)9 was also the modest first 
step towards the same end taken by Europe in 1947¿ and that to put it into 
effect various obstacles had to be overcome. Over and above its results 
with respect to the transfer of balances, this first experiment has had 
the merit of promoting close co-operation in the sphere of payments among 
the European countries concerned»' It is well known that at the stage it 
has now reached, characterized, inter alia, by a monthly conference in 
Basle, where directors of Central Banks meet to seek solutions for common 
problems, the experiment is contributing to the normal conduct and expansion 
of European trade. 
Under the terms of resolution l(l) of the Trade Committee such an 
exchange of information would imply: 
(a) The' periodic compilation, on comparable bases, of statistics on the 
development and balances of the inter-Latin-American clearing accounts; and 
(b) The 
regular distribution of the whole body of these statistics, 
duly classified, among the Central Banks or corresponding monetary 
authorities of the clearing-accounts countries. 
Last January, in order to collect the background data required for the 
proper organization of this exchange of information, the secretariat sent /out a 
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out a questionnaire to the Central Banks or equivalent monetary authorities. 
In the first place, the replies to this questionnaire revealed eagerness to 
co-operate on the part of the institutions consulted, most of whom had had 
practical experience of the drawbacks attendant upon unco-ordinated methods 
of registering the operations transacted through the accounts, and of the 
consequent difficulties in checking one country's record of balances against 
another1s. Secondly, the information supplied - which is summarized below -
was of great value for the more efficient implementation of this aspect of 
resolution l(l)* 
II. BASES FOR THE APPLICATION OF STANDARD METHODS IN THE 
REGISTRATION OF OPERATIONS AND DETERMINATION OF BALANCES 
1© Registration of operations 
At the present moment heterogeneous methods are adopted for registering 
movements within the clearing accounts; nor is it always at the same stage 
of the transaction that the various countries classify these movements under 
specific concepts or items. 
In some countries payments operations with exporters and importers are 
conducted directly by the Central Bank, which authorizes their inclusion in 
the account concerned and classifies them under certain predetermined concopts. 
In others, although the' payments are actually effected through commercial . 
banks, the current practice of communicating each operation to the Central 
Bank enables this latter to register it under*the appropriate concept in the 
corresponding clearing account. There are also cases where the information 
supplied by the commercial banks indicates only the value of the transaction, 
without such details as would permit its classification under any one group 
or item in the clearing account. 
The same applies to notice of the annulment of operations or of a 
change in the value originally declared. Independently of the registration 
of these operations in the account, another State department, working on the 
basis of special documents submitted by the commercial banks, and with a 
view to-the study of the balance of payments, subsequently classifies 
transactions in some considerable detail, mainly in order to ascertain the 
amounts corresponding to visible and invisible trade» 




monetary, authorities consulted, opinion is clearly in. favour, of the 
establishment of a standard classification to be used for registering 
operations in the accounts, as a target which might be reached within a 
relatively short space of time. Such a. classification might take 
approximately the following form: 
A. Receipts: 
F.o.b. value of exports 
Freights and port dues from abroad 
Commission charges and other foreign trade expenditures 
Investment of foreign capital within the country 
Repatriation of capital 
Financial servicing from external sources 




C.i.f. value of imports 
Freights and port dues transferred abroad 
Commission- charges and other foreign trade expenditures 
Investment abroad 
Outflow of capital 
Financial servicing to be covered abroad 




In•the initial phase of progress towards a multilateral payments system, 
resolution l(l) envisages two possible types of transfers of balances from 
a given inter-Latin-American clearing account to others within the region. 
The first are automatic transfers, when the operation involves sums in 
excess of the level of the bilateral credits concerned, and the s6c6rid are 
voluntary transfers, when the operation relates to values falling within' . 
the limit of these credits. 
At the present time, the balances shown on one and the same date in a 
given master account and in the duplicate account kept by the other 
signatory to the clearing agreement in question often fail to coincide. 
Such discrepancies are a result of the lack of uniformity both in methods 
of registration and in the attitudes adopted to the basic question of 
i 
whether the final balances computed in the account should be those deriving 




credits and other eamiitmsr&s relating to transactions which are only in 
their initial stages on the date .when the balance-sheet is closed, and which 
will presumably be \vound.up later on. 
In this context, recognition of the positive importance attaching to 
knowledge of balance trends has given rise to the observation that a 
transfer regime might not work well if it were based on figures other than 
those of the balance deriving from transactions already liquidated,-If a 
different method were adopted, and in determining the balance for transfer 
purposes the figures for transactions under way but not completed were 
also taken into account, it would not perhaps be very easy to establish 
at fixed intervals a final net balance on which possible transfers could 
be based. If the country keeping the duplicate account should not be in 
agreement with the figures arrived at on this basis by the clearing-account 
country responsible for the master account, the resulting consultations 
between the two parties on the adjustment .of the balance might give rise 
to delays which would hold up the regular functioning of the mechanism. 
Incidentally, it may be added that if the tenor of the foregoing comments 
were approved, this would mean that the official figures for any transfer 
of balances would be those periodically communicated, on the basis of 
operations already liquidated, by the Central Bank or monetary authority 
keeping the relevant master account 
Apart from the determination of the balance corresponding to operations 
already liquidated, on the lines referred to below, the statistical and 
potential balances would also be established, so as to provide background 
data on the trends or possible evolution of each country's net position 
in the account'concerned. The additional information obtained from these 
two balances would be of special interest to countries wishing to effect 
voluntary transfers. They would also supply the want of more complete data 
than are at present available to guide, in specific situations^ certain 
Central Banks which purchase agreement-dollars in order to maintain 
quotations for these currencies at a given parity with convertible foreign 
1/ See Bases for the draft standard agreement on a payments regime 
(E/CN.12/C.1/W&.1/3), section B, point 6, second paragraph. 
. /exchange. When 
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exchange..When such purchases stop short at the point corresponding to the 
margin of credit agreed upon between Central Banks, the regular- flow of . 
exports is liable to be seriously interrupted, as the exporter is left, 
uncertain as to the rate of exchange he will obtain for the agreement-
dollar in the future. If the Central Bank of the creditor country knew that 
the other contracting party were arranging to effect imports whose value 
would reduce the debit balance within a fairly short space of time, it 
might not break off its purchases of agreement-dollars at parity prices, 
even if the real balance were already reaching the critical level; it 
would be more likely to continue buying them according to the new situation 
revealed by the information received. From this standpoint, knowledge of 
the balance trends may prove a normalizing factor in regional payments 
operations, as advocated in resolution . l(l) of the Trade Committee. 
To sum up, the inference to be drawn from the consultations is that 
opinion is definitely in favour of the compilation of data in such a way 
as to provide the following information, either monthly or every two months: 
(a) The real balance, or that computed in the master account on the 
basis of trade operations already liquidated; 
(b) The statistical balance, or that deriving from the sum of the real-
balance and the documentary credits received in payment for future exports, 
minus the value of documentary credits covering imports to be effected; and 
(c) The potential balance, or the statistical balance modified in 
accordance with the estimate of operations under way, which are ascertained, 
according to the practices prevailing in each country, through export or 
impart permits or licences, prior deposits, the amount of foreign exchange 
sold at auction, options on the sale of foreign exchange, etc. 
The draft form attached indicates how the pertinent data, once 
compiled, might be distributed to the Central Banks or monetary authorities 
of the inter-Latin-American clearing-accounts countries. 
3» Banking procedure 
In the course of the consultations information was collected- on the 
so-called "bank procedure" agreements concerted directly by the Central 
Banks when they aire empowered to do so by the payments agreements concerned, 




covered by the account. The bank procedure regulations relate mainly to the 
following points: 
(a) The degree to which the commercial banks intervow in the • 
implementation of the agreement; 
(b) Procedures for the opening of documentary credits (whether irrevocable 
or not) by the commercial banks, and for>the posting or cabling of 
orders of paymentj 
(c) The mechanism for recording in the accounts (reimbursements) payments 
made in. accordance with documentary credits and orders of payment; 
(d) The method of annulling or modifying operationsj and 
(e) The system for exchange of information on movements and balances in 
the accounts. 
A preliminary examination of the information collected suggests the • 
possibility of a considerable degree of standardization of bank procedure 
in the various inter-Latin-American clearing accounts, as well as of the 
corresponding.forms. Among the data that could be obtained as a result of 
this rationalization would be those required for preparing the commodity 
trade balance-sheets referred to under the following heading. 
4. Balance-sheets by commodities 
Current methods of registering operations in the accounts do not 
usually record the name of the commodity traded or the volume involved. 
Consequently, to interpret the balance-sheets in relation to the goods 
concerned, it is often necessary to resort to the trade balance figures, 
which cannot always be obtained as promptly as would be desirable« Since 
the success of the multilateral transfer mechanism will to some extent 
depend upon a parallel course of action aimed at reducing diseouilibria 
through an expansion of commodity trade, it may be important to ascertain 
in good time the weight carried by each commodity in the formation of totals 
and balances in the* accounts, and its influence on their fluctuations. 
To this end, in the course of the consultations the Central Banks were 
asked whether they considered it feasible for.a balance-sheet *to be 
systematically drawn up by commodities, alongside"that in which the figures 
were classified by concepts, totals and final balance. From the replies 




interested in this topic * Some stated that they were in a position to 
prepare additional balance-sheets by commodities straight away, although 
as a rule without giving details of the volumes traded. Most of the' Central 
Banks, because of the current methods of registering operations in the 
accounts, are not at present in possession of the data required to draw 
up balance-sheets of this type; but they do not exclude the possibility 
that the gradual standardization of Latin American registration methods, 
with a view to the co-ordination of the clearing mechanisms which at 
present function independently, may enable them to prepare such information 
at a later date. 
5. Other topics 
( a) Location of the master and duplicate accounts 
The replies.suggested that this should be left to the discretion of 
the contracting parties in each case, 
(fc) Comparison of records 
The prevailing opinion was that registers should be compared monthly. 
One point of view advocated fortnighly checking, 
(c) Balance-sheets 
To judge from the answers to the questionnaire, the general feeling 
seems to be that such balance-sheets should not be drawn up for periods 
dating from the entry into operation of the relevant agreement, but for 
terms based on the last day of the month concerned, if the balance-sheet 
is prepared every month, or of the calendar year, if it is drawn up annually. 
Moreover, this is a practice already in common use in the region. 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
From the replies of the Central Banks and equivalent monetary authorities 
it could be deduced that the following procedures were generally considered 
to be advisable; 
1. Application of standard methods 
(a) The authorities consulted deemed it both advantageous and feasible 
to establish common standards for the registration of operations and the 
determination of balances in the inter-Latin-American clearing accounts, 




corresponding to those indicated in point 1 of- section II of the present 
document. Broadly speaking, the Central Banks considered this preliminary 
step of great practical importance for the possible transition from the 
prevailing bilateralism to the desired multilateral system. 
(b) It would be useful to fix a terin, perhaps not shorter than the 
remainder of 1957, within which the Central Banks or equivalent 
organisations could adapt their system of registering the operations 
transacted through the accounts to the groups or concepts mentioned« 
(c) It seems desirable to define bases for consistent collaboration between 
the appropriate Latin American institutions, with the aim of gradually co-
ordinating the bank procedure regulations of the various clearing accounts, 
and standardizing their basic aspects. 
2, Periodic compilation and distribution of information 
(a) The compilation and exchange of comparable data on the inter-Latin-
Amorican clearing accounts can be initiated immediately, but in the 
preliminary stage this process should be confined to the totals and balances 
resulting from the operations registered in the accounts as already 
liquidated. 
(b) Information on balance-sheets should be cabled at the intervals agreed 
upon - either on the last day of each month, or every two months - and 
should comprise the real, statistical and potential balances in every inter-
Latin-American clearing account. As soon as the reform of the registration 
methods permitted, such information would be extended to include data on 
movements of goods and services grouped by concepts. (The draft form 
attached shows how the data compiled would be presented for distribution 
to the Central Banks and equivalent monetary authorities.) 
Country. 


















a/ Cumulative figures since 1 January 195% 
b/ Cumulative balance of the account. 
These figures do not include documentary credit 
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BASES FOR'THE DRAFT"STANDARD AGREEMENT 
OK A PAYMENTS REGIME 
I. INTRODUCTION 
lc At the first session of the Trade Comiittee,-held last November at 
Santiago,'Chile, the inter-Latin-American clearing-accounts countries 
adopted various decisions (see resolution l(l)) aimed at imparting 
flexibility to their current payments relationships and at the gradual 
establishment of a multilateral regime. 
2. "As can be seen in the resolution referred to, the countries in 
question deemed it desirable to adopt concurrently, at the time considered 
most appropriate, specific principles on which to base their reciprocal 
dealings. These basic principles are as follows" 
,T(a) Equal quotations for units of account and convertible currencies 
on the exchange markets concerned, for the same operations; 
,(b) Trade at prices not higher than those prevailing on the world 
market. If no bases for comparison'are available, quotations shall not 
exceed prices paid by any third country under the same conditions; 
(c) Payment through the agreement-accounts of the following items, 
inter alia: 
(i) The value of traded commodities] -
(ii) Freight charges relating to direct traffic; 
(iii) Insurance and reinsurance; 
(iv) Other expenditures accessory to trade; 
(v) Other items agreed upon by the contracting parties; 
(d) Reciprocal credits adequate for the satisfactory development of 
trade,' due allowance being made for seasonal fluctuations; 
(e) Automatic transfers to the accounts of other countries participating 
.in the system of transfer of balances, through communication with the' 
Central Bank of the debtor country, of sums in excess of the stipulated 
swing credits; 
/(f) Transfer from 
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(f) Transfer from one to another of the'above-mentioned countries1 
accounts, by prior agreement between the Central Banks concerned, of 
favourable balances within the swing credits," 
3. Among the factors that might to some extent help to convert the rigid 
bilateralism characterizing the present system of trade through clearing 
accounts into a more flexible trade regime, pending its subsequent 
replacement by a multilateral mechanism, would be the preparation of a 
model or standard payments agreement. Here it may be recalled that the 
Hague Club, for example, is a multilateral payments organization which 
is in practice the outcome of the simultaneous application of a group of 
identical bilateral agreements. 
A twofold purpose would be served by the preparation of a standard , 
agreement for intra-regional payments relationships in clearing accounts. 
On the one hand, it would allow some idea to be formed of how far the 
general principles advocated in resolution l(l) are applicable in the 
initial stage of inter-Latin-American.collaboration at the level in question, 
in view of the different characteristics of trade transactions in each 
bilateral channel. Secondly, the agreement would provide some sort of 
guidance for the gradual establishment of :more or less uniform regulations 
as the pacts in force were renewed or new ones were concluded. In addition, 
it would facilitate the task of concerting a'-common instrument for the 
ultimate establishment of the multilateral regime. 
Alongside these considerations, another of basic importance must be 
emphasized. The heterogeneous nature of the various inter-Latin-American 
agreements in force exerts a depressive influence on trade, since it helps 
to freeze bilateral balances by making them, in practice, non-transferable, 
and thereby aggravates the effects of other problems such as the non-
observance of parities,, the fall in relative prices for units of account, 
and the consequent discouragement and overpricing of exports. Hence the 
importance for the growth of Latin American trade of the co-ordination or 
standardization of the main clauses in such agreements. 
4. It is not always easy or possible to devote separate clauses in the 
agreements to payments questions and to trade matters, or to deal with 




which partake of the characteristics of-both, especially in the case of 
countries whose foreign trade is subject to direct controls deriving from 
the exchange system. In Latin America, therefore, it often happens that 
instruments are concluded which deal indiscriminately in the same text 
with questions of both types 
At the present stage of the work pursuant to resolution 1(l), the 
preparation of>the draft standard agreement would be,confined to topics 
specifically belonging to the sphere of payments. Consequently, trade 
problems involved in payments regulations would be approached only when 
absolutely necessary, and from their own special standpoint• 
5. The various questions arising from the existing agreements and from 
their lacunae have been analysed in another document,--/ which also gives 
some account of the occasionally conflicting opinions expressed in the 
region, or embodied in the bilateral agreements, on matters of both basic 
and secondary importance for intra-regional trade. Subsequently to the 
preparation of this document, which dates from August 1956, the inter-
Latin-American clearirig-*accounts countries., accorded recognition to certain 
general principles relating to the most important topics (parities, prices, 
etc.), 
On these bases, plus the text of the agreements in force, and with 
due rega;rd to resolution 1(1) of the Trade Committee, which advocates the 
need to promote the transition to a multilateral regime, the Working Group 
concerned will attemptat its first meeting to draw up the draft standard 
agreement,, or at all events to make substantial progress towards this 
objective^ 
II. TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION ' 
1« Aims • 
It would be established that the purpose of the agreement was to 
determine norms for payments relationships between the--contracting -parties 
and to facilitate their gradual adaptation to a multilateral regime. 
1/ The Hague Club agreements deal with certain questions specifically : 
relating to trade in an additional document entitled Protocol on trade• 
2/ See Payments and trade in Latin America (E/CN.12/C.l/3)pp» 57-74« 
/2. Operations covered 
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2* Operations covered by the agreement 
In this context, the initial clauses would" define the nature of the 
payments to be subject to the provisions of the agreement, and would 
determine whether these provisions would cover any or all- of the following 
items: 
(a) Payments entailed by direct foreign trade transactions between the 
contracting parties, whether accruing from trade in commodities produced in 
their territories or corresponding to expenditure on commercial .services 
inherent in such trade; 
(b) Payments deriving, by prior agreement between the corresponding 
Central Banks in each case, from the sale or purchase by one of the parties 
of goods produced in other countries; 
(c) Payments corresponding to automatic or voluntary transfers of 
balances to or from third parties, under the terms of resolution l(l), 
paragraphs (e) and (f)j 
(d) Freight earnings of vessels belonging to the contracting parties 
for transport of commodities covered by the agreement between the ports of 
the two countries; 
(e) Expenditures and repair costs for shipping under each country*s 
flag in= ports belonging to the other; 
(f) Freights and insurance relating to trade transactions conducted by 
either of the contracting parties with third Latin American countries, 
possibly after prior consultation in each case between the Central Banks 
concerned; 
(g) Remittances to students; 
(h) Payments connected with frontier trade; and 
(i) Other payments for operations of any kind, authorized in. each case 
by agreement between .-the Central Banks of the contracting parties, 
3 © Accounts and currencies 
This part of the agreement would relate to the clearing account which 
will have to be kept for the liquidation of payments on transactions covered 
by the agreement, as well as to the units of account to be used in the 
invoices presented by dealers in each country and in the recording of 




account is to be kept in accordance with one of the following systems, 
or some other: 
(a) A master account kept by the contracting party indicated in the 
agreement concerned. This would not mean that the other contracting party 
might not also keep an account, but for informative purposes only, as the 
official balance would be that resulting from the master account; 
(b) Counterpart accounts. Each contracting'party keeps the books'for 
a part of the operations. The final balance is obtained by combining the 
balances in the two accounts. 
4. Liquidation of payments and documentary credits 
Under the terms of this clause, payments covered by the agreement would 
be directly effected between the Central Banks of the contracting parties or 
through other banks or institutions,, in the form concerted by the banks 
through a "bank procedure" agreement. 
The text of the standard agreement would contain a proviso authorizing 
the Central Banks to empower commercial banks in each of the contracting 
countries to open whatever documentary credits might be necessary for trade 
purposes, in accordance with banking practices. These credits would be 
reimbursed at the time when the operations were actually put into effect, 
under the clearing account concerned, in accordance with the regulations 
appropiate to the case as established in the bank procedure agreement 
mentioned above. 
5. Parities 
The clauses relating to this point'would be directed towards the 
practical application of one of the principles laid down in resolution l(l) 
of the Trade Committee, pursuant to which each contracting party would adopt 
the necessary measures to ensure equal quotations in its territories for _ 
units of account and convertible dollars,, on both the official and the free 
exchange market, for the same operations. 
As this principle and another relating to transfers of balances would 
have to be applied concurrently, the following question might perhaps"be 
posed here. To comply with the terms of the•parity agreement it might prove 
necessary for the Central Bank concerned to intervene on the' exchange market 




insufficient. The moot point would be whether such intervention should 
or should not cease if this same bank did not effect the transfer to a 
third country of the balance in excess of the stipulated swing credit, or 
if the Central Bank of the debtor country failed to cover the surplus in 
3/ 
question at the proper time 
6. Official crédits and balances 
The relevant clauses would relate to the amount of the swing credits 
customarily granted by the contracting parties under the terms of the 
account. Consequently, they would determine the level above which payment 
of the surplus could be claimed in convertible foreign exchange, partially 
and/or totally negotiable by the creditor with third countries, either 
immediately or after the expiry of a given term*^ If transfers to third 
parties amounting to less than the total surplus were effected, the debtor's 
commitment to cover the excess balance in convertible currency would be 
reduced by a sum equal to that of the transfers in question. 
The agreement would also define whether the collectible balance, 
as well as the balance representing the limit beyond which the automatic 
transfers envisaged in resolution 1(1) could be effected, would be that 
resulting from the record in the master account of operations actually 
liquidated. 
Furthermore, if the sum in excess of the amount of the official 
credit were regarded as the collectible balance, it would have to be 
established whether the balance should assume such a character, or 
should become transferable at the will of the creditor, by virtue of the 
mere fact that it exceeded the level determined in the agreement; or 
whether this would only be the case when, a specified period having elapsed 
since the registration of the balance in question, it was not reduced, by 
means of additional exports on the debtor*s part, to a sum below the level 
fixed. 
3/ Op.cit., p.58. See also the Report of the Trade Committee of the 
Economic Commission for Latin America (E/CN.12/C.l/7^ev.l), pp.27' 
(paragraph 45) and 38• 





The agreement might also determine -whether interest would or would 
not be payable on the debit balance, • . , 
Another point must be noted in the preparation of the standard 
agreement. In view of the special characteristics of some of the payments 
agreements already existing in the region, the new draft will possibly have 
to contain certain alternative clauses^ valid, perhaps, during a transition 
period, with respect to the following two situations: (a) that of pairs of 
countries which trade on account without swing credits and automatically . 
cover their debit balances with convertible dollars at the close of each . 
half-year; and (b) that of pairs of countries which grant each other, 
unlimited credit, payment being at no time collectible in convertible 
foreign exchange. 
To bring this latter practice into line with the principles laid 
down in resolution 1(1), it would perhaps be advisable in such cases 
to introduce a clause providing for the voluntary transfer of part.of--the • 
balance by prior agreement,, on each occasion, between the Central Banks 
concerned. Consideration should also be given to the desirability of 
establishing a limit above which the surplus, while not becoming a 
receivable, could be transferred to third parties at the will of the . 
creditor country.^ : , 
7. Voluntary transfers - < . -
Also in connexion with paragraph (e) of resolution 1(1) of the :. v. 
Trade Committee, a system of prior consultation between the Central Banks: : 
concerned might be instituted in addition for cases in which balances 
covered by the swing credits are to be transferred to third p a r t i e s . > 
8. Other regulations on balances 
In addition to these points, others that might be considered in the : ' . 
relevant clauses would be. the following: 
(a) The debtor's right to pay off at any time part or all ofthe 
balance against him in the clearing account;concerned, either in .convertible 
¿/ See resolution l(l) of the Trade Committee, paragraph;.(e);E/CN.12/C.1/3, 
p.71; E/CN.12/C.1/7 Rev.l, paragraphs 45-47-
6/ E/CN.12/C.1/7 Rev.l, p. 38, paragraph (f). * 
/dollars or , 
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dollars or in other currencies agreed upon between the parties; and 
(b) The debtor country's obligation in every case to settle balances 
by payments of 100,000 dollars or a multiple of this amount, according to 
the extent of the commitment -
9. Prior deposits 
Both to encourage inter-Latin-American trade and to take advantage 
of external private credits, it might perhaps be possible to eliminate 
- still, of course,.on a basis of reciprocity - the prior deposit and the 
immediate payment for allocations of foreign exchange exacted in some 
countries for commodity imports,-̂ / 
. "Aforos" (official base values) 
This is the term usually employed when the country authorizing imports 
assigns them a predetermined maximum unit value3 with a view to limiting 
the corresponding authorization to the value thus fixed-
In preparing the regulations to be embodied in the standard agreement, 
it would have to be decided whether they were to include prior consultation 
between the parties, with a specified period for reply, as to the unit 
values which the importer country wished to fix as the official base values 
for certain products, or as to the modification of these same values when 
they were already established*^ 
11. Temporary exports and imports 
Consideration might be given to the desirability of the agreement's 
containing a clause to facilitate the implementation of agreements relating 
to temporary imports of raw materials for industrial processing and 
subsequent re-export. In such cases, when the agreement had been approved 
by the appropriate foreign trade authority, the movement of goods concerned 
would not be included under the current payments mechanism. This would 
cover only the value added in the transforming process. 
12. General provisos 
Decisions would.have to be reached on such points as the following: 
(a) Whether in matters relating to payments and exchange control • -
not expressly stipulated in the agreement the parties should grant each 
2/ See E/CN.12/C.1/3, PP.26 (last paragraph) - 27. 
8/ See E/CN.12/C.1/3, p. 61. / o t h e r ^ ^ 
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other treatment not less favourable than that accorded to third parties; 
(b) Whether the agreement should be put into provisional effect 
pending ratification, and for how long. Its duration would also have to 
be indicated, and regulations laid down for its prolongation by tacit 
consent and for its denunciation. (This last, for example, should perhaps 
be effected not less than three months before the expiry of each year for 
which the agreement is in force); 
(c) Whether, in order to liberalise their reciprocal trade from the 
quantitative standpoint, the parties should grant each other exemption 
from licence or exchange permit requirements for each export and import 
operation, reserving the right to make exceptions in the case of certain 
commodities specifically indicated in the agreement; 
(d) Whether the parties should declare in general terms their 
intention of replacing the bilateral agreement in due course by another 
compatible with the operation of the multilateral payments régime envisaged 
in resolution l(l) of the Trade Committee; and 
(e) Whether, on the expiry of the bilateral agreement, the clearing 
account concerned should remain open for a given length of time for 
liquidation purposes. The term fixed might be from 6 to 9 months. The 
only object would be the registration of payments corresponding to 
operations begun while the agreement was in force, or deriving from trade 
transactions authorized by the parties under the terms of the agreement 
after its denunciation, provided that this was done in order to reduce or 
cover the debit balance. Once the period assigned had elapsed, the balance 
outstanding would be payable in convertible foreign exchange, unless other 
arrangements had been made. 

